

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01630 041611Z

60

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSM-03 SAM-01 SAB-01 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 IO-11 /085 W

----- 125423

R 041505Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 470

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 1630

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EG, SA, IS, SY, IZ

SUBJECT: ISRAELI ASSESSMENT OF SADAT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

BEGIN SUMMARY: MFA OFFICIALS SEE PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT TO
SAUDI ARABIA AS SUCCESSFUL FROM THE EGYPTIAN POINT OF VIEW.
END SUMMARY.

1. MFA DIRECTOR OF ME AFFAIRS (VERED) AND HER DEPUTY (BARNEA)
HAVE TOLD US THAT SADAT'S VISIT HIGHLIGHTED THE AMBIVALENCE
WHICH THEY SEE IN SAUI RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND OTHER ARAB
STATES. ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS AMBIVALENCE IS THAT SAUDI ARABIA
SUPPORTS SADAT BECAUSE HE IS CONSIDERED A BETTER LEADER THEN
NASSER IN TERMS OF SAUDI INTERESTS AND BETTER THAN ANY LIKELY
SUCCESSOR. AT THE SAME TIME THE SAUDIS DO NOT WANT TO
STRENGTHEN EGYPT TO THE POINT THAT IT MIGHT POSE A FUTURE THREAT
TO SAUDI INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY IF A FUTURE LEADER WERE LESS
FRIENDLY THAN SADAT.

2. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THIS AMBIVALENCE IN ISRAELI EYES IS
THAT SAUDI ARABIA, WHICH IS CONSIDERED MORE EXTREME THAN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01630 041611Z

EGYPT ON ARAB-ISRELI ISSUES, WISHES TO USE ITS FINANCIAL

AID AS LEVERAGE TO BRING EGYPT CLOSER TO THE SYRIAN POSITION, WHICH THE SAUDIS CONSIDER TO BE MORE CORRECT ON THOSE ISSUES. ALSO, THE SAUDIS WISH TO KEEP SYRIA FROM DRIFTING FURTHER INTO THE SOVIET ORBIT AND BELIEVE THAT CLOSER EGYPTIAN/ SYRIAN RELATIONS WOULD HELP PREVENT THAT DRIFT.

3. FOR THESE REASONS AND BECAUSE SAUDI ARABIA WOULD LIKE TO SEE A RELATIVELY STRONG SYRIA TO COUNTER CONTINUING SAUDI FEARS OF IRAQ, IT CAUTIOUSLY SUPPORTS SYRIA. FOR EXAMPLE, IT SUPPORTED SYRIAN PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS IN LEBANON BUT WITH RELUCTANCE BECAUSE THIS SUPPORT FAVORED A LEFTIST RADICAL FACTION. NEVERTHELESS, SAUDI ARABIA REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT SYRIA BECOMING TOO STRONG AND IT REMAINS AFRAID OF "GREATER SYRIA."

4. GIVEN THESE CONTRADICTIONS AND AMBIVALENT INTERESTS, SADAT'S HOSTS EXERTED PRESSURE ON HIM TO MOVE TOWARD SYRIA. HOWEVER, SADAT DID NOT SUCCUMB TO THESE PRESSURES AND ARGUED THAT ARAB STATES SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON SOLVING THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND THEN TURN TO PROBLEMS BETWEEN VARIOUS ARAB STATES. HE TOLD HIS SAUDI HOSTS THAT WHILE THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA ON BASIC GOALS REGARDING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ON THE TACTICS TO BE USED IN ACHIEVING THOSE GOALS. HE STRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN EXTRACT GAINS FOR THE ARABS FROM ISRAEL AND SAID THAT HE REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE POLITICAL OPTION. (VERED AND BARNEA BELIEVE SADAT'S SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT IN KUWAIT THAT SYRIA WOULD BE ON ITS OWN IF IT STARTED A CONFLICT IS PUBLIC CONFIRMATION OF AT LEAST ONE POINT HE MADE TO THE SAUDIS.)

5. IN SUM, SADAT'S VISIT WAS A SUCCESS FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW, ACCORDING TO VERED. HE PROBABLY OBTAINED A PLEDGE FOR FUTURE FINANCIAL AID DURING 1976, IN ADDITION TO THE \$300 MILLION ANNOUNCED DURING HIS VISIT, ALTHOUGH THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT IS UNHAPPY WITH EGYPTIAN BUREAUCRACY AND THE WASTEFUL WAYS IN WHICH SAUDI AID MONEY IS SPENT. THOSE PLEDGES WOULD BRING SAUDI AID TO A TOTAL OF ALMOST ONE BILLION IN 1976.

TOON
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 01630 041611Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, CHIEF OF STATE VISITS, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 MAR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976TELAV01630
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760083-0689
From: TEL AVIV
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760393/aaaadeap.tel
Line Count: 107
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 2
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <13 MAY 2004 by ifshinsr>; APPROVED <08 SEP 2004 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ISRAELI ASSESSMENT OF SADAT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA BEGIN SUMMARY: MFA OFFICIALS SEE PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT TO
TAGS: PFOR, EAID, SA, IS, SY, IZ, EG, (SADAT, ANWAR)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006